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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
RICARDO OZUNA, JR.,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45847
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR-2010-25783

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mindful of the applicable authorities, Ricardo Ozuna, Jr., asserts in this appeal that the
district court erred when it denied his motion for reconsideration of the district court’s denial of
his Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Ozuna was found guilty of lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, I.C. § 181508, with a sentencing enhancement for having been previously convicted of a sexual offense
under I.C. § 19-2520G(2). (R., p.22.)1 The district court imposed a unified sentence of life
imprisonment, with twenty years fixed. (R., p.22.) Mr. Ozuna appealed, and the Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed his judgment of conviction in State v. Ozuna, No. 40165, 155 Idaho 697
(Ct. App. 2013). (R., pp.21-30.)

Mr. Ozuna filed a petition for review, which the Idaho

Supreme Court denied. (See R., p.31.)
Mr. Ozuna subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the district court
summarily dismissed the petition. (See R., pp.39-66.) Mr. Ozuna appealed, and the Idaho Court
of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal of the petition in an unpublished opinion, Ozuna v.
State, No. 43659, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 689 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2016).
(R., pp.67-72.)
Later, Mr. Ozuna filed, pro se, an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal
sentence and request for a hearing. (R., pp.33-35.) Mr. Ozuna asserted, “[t]he sentence is illegal
on its face as the conviction was gained in violation of due process and/or equal protection
governed by the Constitution of the U.S. and a [court’s] obligation to insure fair proceedings.”
(R., p.33.) He asserted, “[i]n this case the defendant himself trie[d] to explain to the court the
need for expert D.N.A. assistance and the fact his public defender is not adhering to this request
to prove his innocence.” (R., p.33.)

1

The Idaho Supreme Court ordered the record on appeal here to be augmented with the record
and transcripts from Mr. Ozuna’s prior appeal, No. 40165. (R., p.99.) All citations to “R.” refer
to the 102-page Limited Clerk’s Record prepared for this appeal. (See R., p.99.)
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Mr. Ozuna asserted the district court, at a pretrial hearing, acknowledged there was a
problem with the claim by Mr. Ozuna’s trial counsel that he did not have the resources to hire
people to conduct DNA testing. (See R., pp.34, 36.) Mr. Ozuna further asserted, “[t]he court
failed to appoint and/or order an expert be appointed sua sponte in light of fundamental fairness
and protect the rights of the defendant as any court is obligated to do pursuant to [the] U.S. and
Idaho Constitution[s] as well as a code of judicial conduct [whereas] the conviction obtained was
because of the due process right [being] violated thus rendering not only the conviction illegal
but any sentence thereafter illegal.” (R., p.34.) He requested “the sentence and/or conviction be
vacated and be remanded back to district court for further proceedings.” (R., p.34.)
The State filed an Objection to Rule 35 Motion and Request for Hearing. (R., pp.37-38.)
The district court then issued an Order Denying Motion to Correct Sentence Pursuant to
I.C.R. 35(a). (R., pp.73-79.) The district court wrote that the State had “not filed a response to
the motion.” (R., p.74.) The district court also noted that the Idaho Supreme Court has “clarified
that I.C.R. 35(a) does not provide a vehicle ‘to reexamine the facts underlying the case to
determine whether a sentence is illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases
in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law or where new
evidence tends to show that the original sentence was excessive.’” (R., p.75 (quoting State v.
Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009)).)
According to the district court, Mr. Ozuna “alleges a purported error that occurred prior
to trial, long before the court sentenced him. That purported error doesn’t address the legal or
statutory basis of the sentence imposed by the court, or whether the sentence was excessive in
light of the facts available to the court when it sentenced him.” (R., p.75.) The district court
stated, “[t]he defendant’s argument in actual fact challenges the merits of his conviction, as the
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results of DNA testing could conceivably bear on the reliability of the jury’s verdict but would
not have any obvious relevance to a determination of what sentence may be imposed by law once
a [judgment] of conviction has been entered.” (R., p.75.) Mr. Ozuna “suggests that DNA
testing, or specifically the lack thereof in this case, undermines the jury’s verdict and means that
any sentence imposed on him is necessarily illegal.”

(R., pp.75-76.)

The district court

determined, “[t]hat argument merely repackages the defendant’s attack on the underlying merits
of his conviction which, as the cases discussed above make clear, the defendant is not permitted
to do in a motion brought pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a).” (R., p.76.)
Further, the district court determined that “even if the defendant’s argument is properly
raised in an I.C.R. 35(a) motion the court isn’t persuaded that it has any merit.” (R., p.76.)
Thus, the district court concluded: “Having carefully considered the full record in this matter,
the court finds that the sole argument advanced here by the [defendant’s] motion is not properly
raised as an I.C.R. 35(a) motion and that the motion must be denied on that basis.” (R., p.78.)
“The court also finds that the arguments raised by the defendant under the umbrella of an
I.C.R. 35(a) motion and/or that the court should have sua sponte ordered DNA testing in the case
have no merit, and that the motion must be denied on that basis as well.” (R., p.78.) The district
court denied the Rule 35(a) motion. (R., p.78.)
Mr. Ozuna then filed, pro se, a Motion Stipulating to States Request for Hearing on Rule
35 Motion and Motion for Order for Transport. (R., p.80.) He also filed, pro se, a Motion for
Reconsideration of “Order Denying Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Pursuant To Rule 35(a)”
as State Did File Response and Requested Hearing (Attached Exhibit “A”). (R., pp.83-84.) The
motion for reconsideration was mailed within fourteen days from the entry of the order denying
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the Rule 35(a) motion.2 (See R., pp.78, 84.) In the motion for reconsideration, Mr. Ozuna
asserted the State had filed a response and requested a hearing on the Rule 35(a) motion.
(R., p.83.) Additionally, he asserted, “any sentence predicated upon a verdict of . . . guilty from
a trial rife with due process violations and/or errors with this [court’s] knowledge and
understanding of the need for fundamental fairness (DNA expert) is most certainly illegal on its
face.” (R., pp.83-84.) Mr. Ozuna asserted, “[t]o continue to excuse the repugnant neglect of
defendants by purposeful inept actions of defense counsel/[attorneys] under disguise of ‘strategy’
is a conspired [demise] of this United States Constitution and should not be tolerated in the least.
Further this court was aware of said need and thus should [have] made inquiry to aid in the
continued false convictions of citizens of the State of Idaho.” (R., p.84.)
The district court subsequently issued an Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration.
(R., pp.88-92.) The district court regretted the error it had made when it wrote the State had not
filed a written response to the Rule 35(a) motion. (See R., p.89.) However, the district court was
not persuaded that reconsideration of its prior order was required, because the district court had
“concluded that the defendant’s arguments were entirely without merit. The state’s response—
which is in fact little more than a conclusory statement that the defendant’s motion does not
provide a viable basis for the relief sought—does not in any way alter the court’s previously
stated conclusion.” (R., p.89.)
The district court also recognized that whether to conduct a hearing on a Rule 35 motion
is directed to the sound discretion of the court, and determined Mr. Ozuna “has not identified any

2

The order denying the Rule 35(a) motion was issued on November 28, 2017. (R., p.73.) The
motion for reconsideration was mailed on December 7, 2017. (See R., p.84.) Under the
“mailbox rule,” documents by pro se inmates “are considered to be filed when they are delivered
to prison authorities for the purpose of mailing to the court clerk.” Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88,
91 (Ct. App. 2006).
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information or arguments he intended to present at a hearing that he couldn’t present in his
written pleadings.” (R., pp.89-90.) The district court then determined, “[w]ithout a showing that
the court’s decision to proceed without a hearing actually limited the scope of the information
presented for the court’s consideration, the court has no basis to conclude that it acted outside the
scope of the discretion it enjoys in this area when it declined to order a hearing on this motion.”
(R., p.90.)
The district court next stated, “based on the arguments presented by defendant there is
virtually no chance that additional information would have altered the court’s previously stated
conclusions.”

(R., p.90.)

The district court had previously determined that Mr. Ozuna’s

arguments failed on their merits, and that his “motion was deficient as a matter of law because
the arguments raised in support of that motion merely repackaged the defendant’s attack on the
underlying merits of his conviction which the defendant is not permitted to do in a motion
brought under I.C.R. 35(a).” (R., p.90 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).) The
district court wrote, “[a]s the cases relied on by the court in that order have not been overruled or
abrogated, additional information presented in support of the defendant’s motion would not alter
the court’s conclusion that the motion was deficient as a matter of law.” (R., p.90.)
Thus, the district court concluded: “Having carefully considered the full record in this
matter, the court hereby denies the defendant’s motion to reconsider, and hereby re-affirms the
findings and conclusions set out in the [previous order], except to the extent that the [previous
order] incorrectly indicates that the State failed to file a written opposition to the Defendant’s
I.C.R. 35(a) motion.” (R., p.91.) The district court also “denies as moot the defendant’s request
for a hearing on that motion, and for an order to transport the defendant for such hearing for the
reasons described above.” (R., p.91.)
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Mr. Ozuna filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal of Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration of Denial of Rule 35(a) Motion and Motion to Appoint Counsel, timely from the
district court’s Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration. (R., p.93.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ozuna’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of
his Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ozuna’s Motion For Reconsideration Of The
Denial Of His Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) Motion To Correct An Illegal Sentence
Mindful of the applicable authorities, Mr. Ozuna asserts that the district court erred when
it denied his motion for reconsideration of the district court’s denial of his Idaho Criminal
Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal fashion is a question
of law, over which an appellate court exercises free review. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84
(2009). When deciding a motion for reconsideration, a district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276 (2012). Likewise, when reviewing a
trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration, an appellate court uses the
same standard of review used by the trial court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. Id.
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 provides that a district court “may correct a sentence that is
illegal from the face of the record at any time.” I.C.R. 35(a). “[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’
under Rule 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e.,
does not involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.” Clements, 148
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Idaho at 86. “[U]nder Rule 35, a trial court cannot examine the underlying facts of a crime to
which a defendant pled guilty to determine if the sentence is illegal.” State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho
55, 65 (2015) (citing Clements, 148 Idaho at 84-87). “Rule 35 inquiries must involve only
questions of law—they may not include significant factual determinations to resolve the merits
of a Rule 35 claim. If a district court does inquire and make significant factual determinations, it
exceeds its scope of authority under Rule 35.” Id. (citing Clements, 148 Idaho at 87-88).
Mindful of Clements and Wolfe, Mr. Ozuna asserts that the district court erred when it
denied his motion for reconsideration of the district court’s denial of his Rule 35(a) motion to
correct an illegal sentence. As Mr. Ozuna asserted in the motion for reconsideration, “any
sentence predicated upon a verdict of . . . guilty from a trial rife with due process violations
and/or errors with this [court’s] knowledge and understanding of the need for fundamental
fairness (DNA expert) is most certainly illegal on its face.” (See R., pp.83-84.) Thus, the district
court erred when it denied Mr. Ozuna’s motion for reconsideration.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Ozuna respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, electronically as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Delivered via e-mail to: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BPM/eas
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